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Summary 
This paper examines the role of the democratic emerging powers – India, Brazil, South Africa, 
Indonesia, and Turkey – in promoting democracy beyond their own borders. The relevance of this 
issue stems from the increased significance of these countries in world affairs – as evidenced by 
their phenomenal economic ascent, growing clout in international trade negotiations and strong 
voice in global fora such as the G20 – which raises the question of how they could also contribute 
to broader global public goods. 
The paper argues that such a contribution could be significant, especially given the relative lack of 
progress of western-sponsored democracy-support activities and the remarkable resilience of au-
thoritarian regimes worldwide. The democratic emerging powers have some potential advantages 
compared to western democracy supporters, such as their own experiences in transitioning from 
authoritarian to democratic rule and their greater proximity to non-democratic regimes, which 
could render their democracy support better targeted and therefore more relevant. 
The paper goes on to examine why the democratic emerging powers so far have fallen short of 
realising this potential. It argues that the decision of whether or not to support democratisation 
processes beyond one’s own borders is not straightforward; on the contrary, it is rooted in “state 
preferences”, a complex amalgam of values, interests and structures of representation and power, 
which is in turn conditioned by surrounding regional and global environments. 
The paper then uses this theoretical framework to analyse the democracy support provided by In-
dia, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey. Adopting a comparative perspective, it examines 
their respective origins and drivers, supplies an overview of key policies and initiatives, and ven-
tures an assessment as well as a tentative outlook towards the future. The analysis reveals that 
while all five countries studied – to varying degrees and with the partial exception of Turkey – 
have supported democratisation processes beyond their own borders, they have done so rather 
cautiously. Fear of a heightened risk of political instability in surrounding states, as well as that of 
harming vital security and economic interests and of providing inroads to extra-regional rivals 
emerge as the principal reasons behind this stance. 
The paper identifies four key factors that help explain the various commonalities and differences 
among the five cases studied, namely, recent memories of democratic transitions; the relative 
strength of democratic fabrics; the presence or absence of significant security challenges; as well 
as economic interests; and the potential for regional expansion. The paper argues that a shift to a 
more proactive stance on external democracy promotion would require the democratic emerging 
powers to make some critical choices as to how to fill their new regional and global leadership 
roles. Western democracy promoters, in turn, could influence these processes and help build equi-
table partnerships, as long as they acknowledge the distinct challenges faced by these democratic 
emerging powers and adhere to commonly held democratic standards and principles. 
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1 Introduction 
The worldwide trend towards more democracy and expanded political and civil liberties, 
thought virtually unstoppable in the last decade of the twentieth century (Fukuyama 1992), 
has come to a halt or at least slowed to a crawl (notwithstanding the recent – since faded – 
enthusiasm surrounding the Arab Spring of 2011).1 Authoritarian regimes the world over 
have proved remarkably resistant to the successive democratic “waves” (Huntington 1991) 
engulfing them, sometimes through outright repression but also by adapting to or circum-
venting the democratic rules of the game. In addition, instead of full-blown democracies, a 
range of semi-autocratic or “hybrid” regimes (Diamond 2002) have sprung up, situated 
somewhere between autocratic and democratic rule.2 
These setbacks notwithstanding, efforts to promote democracy3 have continued (Price 
2009; Wiarda 2009; McFaul 2010), propelled by the unbroken attractiveness of the demo-
cratic model to millions of people worldwide and sustained by a considerable institutional 
infrastructure especially in the United States (US) and Western Europe. Democracy pro-
moters have expanded their toolkit, adding items such as support for the rule of law (Sen 
1999; Foweraker / Krznaric 2002; Ferejohn / Pasquino 2003) or political party strengthen-
ing (Gershman 2004) to old stalwarts like electoral support or institution-building. The 
sequencing of democratic reforms has attracted greater attention, with some scholars ques-
tioning the reliance on early elections in the absence of a functioning institutional frame-
work and broadly representative political parties (Mansfield / Snyder 2007). Furthermore, 
substantial efforts were made to strengthen civil society in transition countries (Ottaway / 
Carothers 2000; Lovell 2007), even to include traditional forms of governance (e. g., el-
ders’ councils) in the new democratic framework (Youngs 2011). 
But at the same time, western-led attempts to build democracy have been criticised as in-
effectual, unsuited to the needs of democratising states, or for being self-interested and 
                                                 
1  Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report 2013 notes that the year 2012 marked “the seventh 
consecutive year in which countries with declines [in freedom] outnumbered those with improvements 
(Freedom House 2013, 1). The report also mentions that the overall number of countries considered 
“free” had risen to 90 from the previous year, “suggesting that the overall ferment includes a potential 
for progress as well as deterioration” (ibid.). 
2  It is doubtful that these developments signalled an “authoritarian resurgence,” in the sense of an actual 
increase in the power and attractiveness of authoritarian regimes. More likely they reflected a greater 
appreciation of the many existing obstacles to democratisation processes, rooted in unfavourable do-
mestic conditions and the real power of non-democratic elites to resist them. See Burnell / Schlum-
berger (2010, 3). 
3  Since “democracy promotion” is sometimes taken to include the imposition of democracy by force, 
some prefer to speak instead of “democracy support” when referring to activities aimed at fostering 
democracy and human rights. (The European Union, for example, has stressed that it supports different 
forms of democracy – not least given the diversity of democratic practice expressed by its own member 
states – instead of promoting a single model, although Kurki (2012) has criticised the EU’s rhetoric as 
“fuzzy” and “vague”). Given that the exact meaning of these terms remains contested in the literature, 
they will be used interchangeably in this paper, generally without any reference to the use of force. By 
contrast, the term “democracy assistance” is used in a more limited sense, referring to particular activi-
ties in support of specific actors. See Burnell (2007, 1 f.) or Acuto (2008, 464 f.) for attempts to arrive 
at more precise definitions. 
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insincere.4 Cultural and religious barriers, together with widespread corruption or other 
governance deficits certainly have proved to be formidable obstacles, particularly in the 
conflict-ridden contexts of the Middle East. Historic inequalities, tensions over indigenous 
rights or regional disparities have allowed neo-populist regimes to warp democratic insti-
tutions, as in the Andean countries of South America. Perhaps most damaging, Western 
concerns for political stability – and for protecting its own strategic interests – have some-
times trumped those for more democracy and better protection of human rights, not least 
in the course of the second Bush administration’s disastrous attempts to forcibly install 
democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan.5 
These critiques, along with the perceived failure of democracy promotion policies to pro-
duce concrete, actionable results (Burnell 2007),6 have contributed to a feeling that, in the 
words of one of its principal proponents, “the democracy enterprise is at a puzzling half-
way state” (Carothers 2011). Despite the efforts to adjust and rejuvenate the instruments 
and methods used – mentioned just above – these critiques have reinforced a sense of un-
certainty within the democracy promotion camp over what to do next, along with calls for 
“new strategies” (Carothers / Youngs 2011b). Even in Europe, where these sentiments are 
perhaps less acute than in the United States or Canada, there have been calls for “new in-
sights,” notably to better understand how democratisation processes unfold in practice, 
and for greater openness in engaging with conceptual alternatives to liberal representative 
democracy that lie outside of the political mainstream (Burnell 2013, 267). This would 
yield entry points for democracy promoters, enabling them to make better decisions as to 
when, where, and how to engage, and when, where, and how not to. 
Seen against this background, one of the most significant developments in recent years has 
been the rise of the “democratic emerging powers” (DEPs), a label that can be applied to a 
group of seemingly disparate countries – specifically, India, Brazil, South Africa, Indone-
sia and Turkey – which nonetheless share a number of key characteristics. Most notably, 
these democratic emerging powers have experienced a phenomenal economic ascent in 
recent decades, turning them into major players in global trade negotiations and giving 
them increased clout in global governance fora such as the Group of Twenty (G20). But as 
opposed to emerging authoritarian powers – such as Russia and especially China, which 
saw their economies and influence grow as well – these countries have also restructured 
their political systems in the course of their economic rise, making them more open and 
democratic, often following long periods of non-democratic rule. At the same time, the 
                                                 
4  See Carothers (2006) and Youngs (2010). Some critics (Hobson 2009; Kurki 2010; Bridoux / Hobson / 
Kurki 2012) have gone further, arguing that democracy promotion remains fundamentally disconnected 
from local realities – due to its over-reliance on exporting western “blueprints” – and that it is informed 
by a minimalist, largely procedural notion of liberal democracy. In turn, these critics were themselves 
accused of putting undemocratic state-led development ahead of protecting core liberal norms (Youngs 
2011, 14). 
5  Of course, the United States has a much longer history of intervening in other countries, notably in 
Latin America. This is a principal reason why developing nations tend to be wary of US-sponsored at-
tempts to promote democracy. European-led programmes have also been criticised for being self-
interested and insufficiently geared towards the needs of recipient countries (Youngs 2010), although 
they do not usually go hand-in-hand with military interventions. 
6  Burnell responded “Yes? No? We really do not know.” to his own rhetorical question “Does interna-
tional democracy promotion work?” (Burnell 2007, 11 f.). 
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democratic emerging powers differ from smaller emerging democratic countries given 
their much larger economies, populations and availability of other resources, putting them 
in a position to back up their claims to play leadership roles not just on the global stage 
but also in their respective regions. 
The specific characteristics of the DEPs – large, rising economies that have voiced leader-
ship ambitions but are democratically constituted – and their increasing relevance in re-
gional and global affairs have produced expectations regarding their potential role in pro-
moting democracy beyond their own borders. Western democracy promoters in particular 
have urged them to play a greater role in supporting democratisation processes elsewhere, 
in their own regions but possibly also beyond, now that their own democratic systems are 
reasonably stable and consolidated. Democracy promoters have also expressed the hope 
that the democratic emerging powers might be able to transcend some of the shortcomings 
of Western-led democracy promotion efforts. Specifically, it was hoped that the DEPs 
would: 
• First, be able to provide more relevant assistance to democracy-building efforts than 
their Western counterparts, based on their own, often more recent experience of transi-
tioning from authoritarianism, and greater familiarity with the challenges of building 
democracy in third-world conditions. This would help to overcome the aforemen-
tioned reliance on “blueprints” and other forms of “exporting” democracy. 
• Second, be open to building more context-sensitive forms of democracy that would 
complement but also go beyond the western-style representative model – incorporat-
ing, for example, forms of participatory democracy or traditional norms and traditions, 
such as cultural or religious ones. This could help address the perceived “substantive” 
deficit of representative democracy, by demonstrating that inclusive social and eco-
nomic policymaking designed to address developmental deficits can go hand-in-hand 
with – indeed, be intrinsic to – democratic forms of representation. 
So far, these expectations have largely been left unfulfilled. While all the democratic 
emerging countries – with the partial exception of Turkey7 – have provided democracy 
support of some sort to other countries, their desire to maintain good relations with re-
gimes of all types has often muted their defence of democracy and human rights abroad 
(Brookings 2011, Carothers / Youngs 2011a, b). Reluctant to interfere in other nations’ 
internal affairs and wary of what they perceive as Western interventionism, they have been 
careful not to harm their other foreign policy interests, even if this made their democracy 
support less effective. 
This stance is perplexing: it would seem that the democratic emerging powers cannot af-
ford to remain indifferent to the persistence of authoritarianism and the various tensions 
this produces in their immediate neighbourhoods. Political globalisation has added a fur-
ther twist: increasingly called upon to contribute to delivering global public goods, the 
democratic emerging powers could parlay more support for democracy and human rights 
into a more prominent role at the United Nations and in other global fora – one of their 
key foreign policy goals – and a greater say also on other key global governance issues. 
                                                 
7  Turkey has avoided framing its foreign policy in terms of supporting democracy, although some of its 
initiatives to mitigate and help resolve regional conflicts could be seen in this light. See case study be-
low. 
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The present paper sets out to explain this apparent contradiction, focusing on three inter-
related questions which will form the backbone of the following sections. First, the paper 
delves more deeply into the motivations behind the democratic emerging powers’ democ-
racy promotion policies, in an attempt to go beyond the black-and-white depictions some-
times found in the literature.8 It argues that such policies are rooted in “state preferences” 
(Moravcsik 2008, 2010): a complex amalgam of drivers and constraints – notably values, 
interests and structures of power and representation – which are in turn conditioned by the 
openings or obstacles presented by surrounding regional and global environments. Sec-
ond, the paper takes a look at the actual democracy promotion policies enacted by the five 
countries examined here, adopting a comparative lens in order to do so. It identifies four 
key factors that help explain relevant patterns and commonalities, as well as key differ-
ences, namely, recent memories of democratic transitions, the relative strength of demo-
cratic fabrics, the presence of significant security challenges, as well as economic interests 
and the potential for regional expansion. Third and finally, the paper offers some thoughts 
on what policy directions the democratic emerging powers might adopt in the future, and 
how others – particularly traditional Western democracy supporters such as the United 
States, Canada, or European states – could interact with them. Essentially, Western states 
should recognise that the democratic emerging powers face distinct challenges, but they 
should also uphold democratic standards, including their own. 
2 Why promote democracy? A brief look at interests, values and contexts 
Democracy promotion efforts are often based – implicitly or explicitly – on some version 
of the democratic peace theory, which asserts that democracy is conducive to peace, pros-
perity, and mutual collaboration among democratic nations.9 Put simply, the theory holds 
that democratic nations do not wage war on one another, since their rulers are accountable 
to the people who are generally adverse to war.10 In addition, democratic nations favour 
market economies and encourage the economic activities of their citizens, which tends to 
lift mutual trade and has a beneficial effect on overall prosperity. Finally, since democratic 
nations have a general proclivity to seek peaceful solutions to their differences, they will 
also be more open to finding collaborative solutions in areas other than security or eco-
nomic welfare. 
Given the purported benefits of the democratic peace, one would assume that democratic 
nations will want to promote democracy elsewhere, in their own neighbourhoods as well 
                                                 
8  See, for example, Cornell (2012) who asserts that key Turkish policymakers are first and foremost 
Islamists whose core values will never correspond with those underpinning representative democracy. 
9  The validity of the democratic peace theory and its supposed benefits continue to be much debated. See, 
for example, Rosato (2003) and Doyle (2005). At the same time, “the proposition that democratic insti-
tutions and values help states cooperate with each other ... has held up reasonably well [and] the belief 
that democracies never fight wars against each other is the closest thing we have to an iron law in social 
science” (Snyder 2004, 57). 
10  Importantly, democratic peace theory does not preclude the possibility of democratic nations going to 
war against non-democratic ones (liberal democracies can develop a quasi-missionary zeal to spread 
democracy, including by force, as pointed out by Jack Snyder (2004). Democratic nations are not 
thought to be more peaceful in general (monadic peace), just less prone to fight one another (dyadic 
peace). 
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as beyond. It certainly seems plausible that democratic states would want to coexist with 
others that have comparable goals and visions, in an environment that allows for negotia-
tion and compromise, rather than in hostile surroundings. This assumption, however, is 
not supported by the evidence, at least not always. Democratic states sometimes behave 
quite differently, supporting autocratic regimes or at least looking the other way when 
faced with their abuses, while often hesitating to back democratic reform movements and 
sometimes actively discouraging them. The explanation for this behaviour is not simply 
that they are democracies in name only – an accusation often levelled at the democratic 
emerging nations, but also against Western states, particularly the United States – al-
though of course their political systems are not flawless. Even for committed democracies, 
there are some good arguments against democracy promotion. 
Some of these arguments relate to the very nature of democracy itself. One of the key di-
lemmas for democracy promoters is that democracy results from a process that tends to 
unfold over longer periods of time and whose outcomes cannot be predicted in advance. 
Requiring a long-term, strategic commitment to succeed, the benefits of democratisation 
are tenuous and uncertain, while its risks and costs are direct and immediate. Especially 
important from the perspective of the democratic emerging nations is the fact that democ-
ratisation processes tend to be conflictual and can produce significant political instability 
in the short and medium term (Mansfield / Snyder 1995), or give rise to hybrid regimes 
that remain “stuck” somewhere in a grey zone between authoritarianism and democracy 
(Carothers 2002; Diamond 2002). Faced with the prospect of such instability affecting 
their own, still fragile polities, policymakers in democratic emerging states may instead 
opt for backing unwanted, but stable and established autocracies instead. 
A further risk stems from systemic competition between democratic emerging powers and 
authoritarian ones, particularly China, who are keen to expand their own spheres of influ-
ence (Bader / Grävingholt / Kästner 2010). Authoritarian powers can act as sources of 
diplomatic support for smaller authoritarian states, they can absorb their exports in ex-
change for strategic supplies, and they can provide much-needed development finance and 
technical assistance. Alternatively, smaller authoritarian states can deflect pressures to 
democratise by banding together, thereby marginalising or at least restricting the influence 
of much bigger states in their regions. These are real concerns for all democratic emerging 
powers, but they are even more acute for those – such as India – that face real challenges 
to their external security, in addition to a potential loss of political influence and economic 
clout. 
Clearly, then, there are two different logics at play, one militating in favour of supporting 
democracy elsewhere, and another one against it. Whereas the first logic emphasises 
states’ long-term, strategic interests – peace, prosperity, greater collaboration to solve 
shared problems – the other one points to the more immediate risks inherent in democrati-
sation processes – increased uncertainty regarding political outcomes, rising instability 
and greater potential for violence in the short and medium term, and the potential of dam-
aging foreign policy interests by involuntarily empowering autocratic rulers or creating 
inroads for competing extra-regional powers. 
Faced with these competing logics, democratic states have three basic options when decid-
ing whether or not to support democratisation processes beyond their own borders. The 
first such option is not to promote democracy proactively and instead rely on passive 
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demonstration and diffusion effects, in the hope of reaping the benefits of further democ-
ratisation without incurring the potential costs. Samuel Huntington (1991) showed that 
such external influences were instrumental in bringing about the “third wave” of democra-
cy in the late twentieth century.11 A strategy based on passive demonstration and diffusion 
effects might appear sensible not just because it is relatively risk free, but also because 
there is still much uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness and impact of more proactive 
democracy promotion policies (Burnell 2007; 2011). At the same time, however, diffusion 
as a strategy to spread democracy has its own limitations, notably the fact that in order to 
be effective, it requires that a critical mass of states in a given region are already demo-
cratic. With respect to the cases examined in this paper, such favourable conditions are 
simply not present.12 Furthermore, diffusion does not seem to be particularly effectual in 
preventing the re-emergence of autocratic regimes, or that of hybrid regimes that are nei-
ther truly democratic nor fully authoritarian. 
The second option, then, is to support democratisation processes cautiously and selective-
ly, while controlling and if possible eliminating the inherent risks, and without endanger-
ing vital security or economic interests. For example, Cooper / Farooq (2013) have shown 
that democratic emerging powers such as India, Brazil and South Africa have privileged 
relatively uncontroversial activities in their bilateral support to democratising states, for 
example, capacity-building and training to run elections. Support for more contentious 
activities – such as promoting good governance or funding civil society organisations to 
foster democratic values – was accorded much less importance and provided mostly under 
the cover of partnerships with Western countries or in the context of multilateral initia-
tives. The countries in question – all five countries examined in this paper, in marked con-
trast to some Western democracy supporters – were also careful to offer their assistance 
only when invited to do so by the recipient countries. 
Such an approach might indeed limit the risks of pushing for more democracy beyond 
one’s own borders and allow the democratic emerging powers to remain on good terms 
with their autocratic neighbours. Engaging at least partially with Western-sponsored de-
mocracy promotion initiatives also has the advantage of mollifying Western critics who 
have charged that the DEPs are not doing enough to further global public goods. Still, as 
will become clearer further on in this paper, the effectiveness of such an approach in 
bringing about democratic change is open to question. Furthermore, while it mitigates cer-
tain key risks to the democratic emerging powers, it is not completely risk-free. Even a 
cautious, carefully calibrated engagement in favour of democracy elsewhere can highlight 
                                                 
11  Subsequent research confirmed the existence of such demonstration and diffusion effects, resulting in 
“clusters” of democratic states that could not be explained solely on the basis of domestic “requisites” 
of democracy (Gleditsch / Ward 2006). 
12  Brazil is a partial exception, in the sense that the diffusion of democratic norms and values in the 1980s 
and 1990s did facilitate the latest wave of democratic transitions in Latin America. But even there, dif-
fusion did not play much of a role in consolidating and deepening actual democratic practice after-
wards, and it did little to stop the rise of neo-populist regimes in Venezuela, Bolivia or Ecuador. India 
is a good counterexample, demonstrating that the presence of just one democratic state in a given re-
gion – even one as powerful as India – does not automatically result in meaningful diffusion effects. As 
regards Turkey, which among the cases studied here has relied the most on passive demonstration and 
diffusion effects, the exemplary power of its democracy for surrounding states derives at least in part 
from the country’s democratic “anchor” in the European Union, not just from its own experience. See 
the following section for further details. 
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democratic deficiencies at home, and it can appear contradictory when contrasted, for ex-
ample, with expansionary economic policies that pay little heed to the needs of neighbour-
ing countries. Conversely, even a limited engagement with Western democracy promoters 
can open the DEPs up to charges that they are beholden to hidden Western agendas and 
are doing the West’s bidding. 
The third option, finally, is to support democracy elsewhere more deliberately and proac-
tively, despite the associated risks and in accepting that doing so might well conflict with 
other important interests. There are two plausible explanations why democratic states 
would do so. One of them relates to the role of values and principles in democratic socie-
ties and the way in which these are brought to bear on the formulation of foreign policy. 
Democratic states have public spheres that allow for the expression of opinions and be-
liefs, giving pro-democracy actors a stage from which to demand consistency between the 
values and principles that govern domestic policymaking, as well as those that guide ex-
ternal policy. If expressed forcefully enough, such normative concerns can come to over-
ride the “pragmatic” or “realistic” foreign policy considerations that might prevail other-
wise, which are based not on values but rational – although often short-term and some-
times short-sighted – cost-benefit calculations. 
This dynamic is perhaps most apparent in the context of transitions from authoritarian to 
democratic rule. Often accompanied by significant social mobilisations, the resulting up-
surge in pro-democracy sentiment can provoke far-reaching changes in the foreign-policy 
posture of the respective countries. Obviously, though, democratic transitions are special 
periods and pro-democracy constituencies tend to become smaller and less vocal with the 
return to normal life. Likewise, governments tend to reassert their prerogatives especially 
for foreign policymaking, often helped by enduring traditions of secrecy and a lack of 
transparency and accountability rooted in foreign policy ministries not accustomed to ex-
ternal scrutiny. Despite these obstacles, in all the countries examined here, pro-democracy 
actors such as civil society organisations, parts of the media, or parliamentary oversight 
committees, have managed to keep relevant issues on the public radar and thereby put 
pressure on their governments, albeit to varying degrees. But overall, the democratic fab-
ric in these countries is still fairly weak and will need to be nourished and supported in 
years to come.13 
Another plausible explanation for why states decide to promote democracy beyond their 
own borders, which incorporates but also goes beyond the first explanation, is that “state 
preferences” (Moravcsik 2008, 2010) change, which in turn provokes changes in their 
foreign policy postures. In this view, state preferences are seen not just as the result of 
social identities and values, but also economic interests as expressed by firms and owners 
of assets but also workers, as well as structures of representation and power that determine 
which social groups or coalitions will be able to “capture” the state and impose their 
views. When these parameters shift, states can come to decide that promoting democracy 
is not only “the right thing to do” but also, crucially, in their own best interest, given the 
                                                 
13  Helping to do so, or at least not erecting additional obstacles (such as restrictive regulations governing 
the activities of civil society groups), might be in the best interest of the governments concerned. Great-
er openness in foreign policymaking and improved consistency between the principles governing do-
mestic and foreign policies help improve the legitimacy of democratic regimes, with positive implica-
tions for political stability and public acceptance of policy choices once made. 
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long-term, strategic benefits of the democratic peace or in other words, the “utilitarian 
value” of democratic rule. 
A crucial underlying assumption is that state preferences are the result of domestic societal 
processes of identity formation, interest formulation, and political articulation, which in 
turn determine “national interests” and therefore the stances states take in the international 
arena. In other words, state preferences and therefore state interests are not static and im-
mutable – as both realists and institutionalists in international relations theory would have 
it – but vary according to domestic societal preferences.14 But at the same time, since 
states themselves are embedded not only in domestic but also transnational society, their 
actions are framed and conditioned by regional and global contexts as well. 
In the case of the democratic emerging powers, all these contexts – domestic, regional, as 
well as transnational – are currently in in a state of flux. In some of these countries exam-
ined here – Brazil, India, and Turkey, notably – deficiencies in domestic governance sys-
tems have led to popular protests and demands for qualitative improvements, which are 
sometimes resisted by the authorities. At the regional and global level, India, Brazil, South 
Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey have all been pushing for greater leadership roles; at the 
same time, the precise content of these roles has been changing, too. These changes are 
driven, on the one hand, by the democratic emerging powers’ increasing economic clout, 
and their resulting aspiration for a greater say in regional and global affairs, and on the 
other hand, their evolving identities as emerging democracies. In regional contexts, this 
has produced more leadership claims by the democratic emerging powers, who are aiming 
to put issues – including greater respect for democracy and human rights – on the regional 
agenda, frame debates around them, and persuade others to move along. Neighbouring 
states, who had long insisted on their national sovereignty and rejected any interference in 
their domestic affairs,15 are slowly becoming more receptive, although they remain con-
cerned about new forms of regional dominance and (economic) imperialism. In global 
settings, the democratic emerging powers have gained greater clout in the context of inter-
national trade negotiations, and they have become part of global governance mechanisms 
such as the G20. At the same time, they have refused – mostly – to join Western-led ef-
forts to deliver a range of “global public goods” – including democracy and greater respect 
for human rights – largely out of distrust for Western motives and for fear of being in-
strumentalised in the interest of hidden agendas. 
Processes such as these are by their very nature open-ended. Importantly, they encompass 
policy establishments, policymakers, and state bureaucracies – they are not limited just to 
                                                 
14  There is some overlap between Moravcsik’s liberal brand of international relations theory and the con-
structivist strand as formulated, for example, by Alexander Wendt (1992), in the sense that both see 
value orientations and social identities as central for the formulation of foreign policy. Realists and in-
stitutionalists, by contrast, hold that states act according to their material interests – guaranteeing their 
survival and maximising their power – which are essentially seen as constant. Liberalism and construc-
tivism do differ in important ways: liberalism attaches greater importance to processes of interest for-
mulation and political representation, whereas constructivism puts greater emphasis on the power of 
ideas and the meanings that individuals and societies attach to their surroundings. 
15  The democratic emerging powers themselves long supported the non-interference principle – and to 
some extent still do – due to their roots in the Non-Aligned Movement (where India and Indonesia 
played especially prominent roles). 
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mobilised sectors of civil society or economic operators – with crucial implications for 
how states see themselves and what they consider to be “in their best interest.” Before 
coming back to these issues in the conclusion to this paper, the following second section 
will take a closer look at what the democratic emerging powers – India, Brazil, South Af-
rica, Indonesia and Turkey – have or have not done to advance democracy in their respec-
tive regions. More specifically, it will ask what motivated the respective policies, how 
obstacles and challenges were addressed, as well as what distinguished the different ap-
proaches. 
3 The democratic emerging countries as democracy supporters 
3.1 India: doing more while being seen to be doing less 
Origins and drivers 
Despite continuous support for democracy at home, Indian foreign policy regarding the 
promotion of democracy abroad has undergone some significant shifts over the years.16 
Basically, these shifts can be broken down into three distinct phases (Muni 2009), reflect-
ing a struggle between India’s commitment to democratic values, the careful consideration 
of its security and economic interests along with the need to contain the fractiousness of 
its own polity (Mehta 2011, 102) and, more recently, a re-evaluation of its place in the 
region and in the world. 
The first, post-independence phase under Jawaharlal Nehru was characterised by, on the 
one hand, a strong commitment to democratic values and institutions, stemming from In-
dia’s struggle for independence, and on the other hand, an equally strong sense of India’s 
insecurity as a relatively weak country in an inhospitable region. The result was a constant 
balancing act that saw India support the principles of national independence and self-
determination, particularly in the context of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), but at 
the same time resist democratic aspirations in neighbouring countries when these threat-
ened regional stability. In the second, post-Nehruvian phase, interest-based calculations 
became more prominent and expressions of support for democratic rule abroad less fre-
quent, not coincidentally at the same time as Indian democracy faced threats at home, 
stemming from the imposition of emergency legislation under Indira Gandhi. The third 
phase, following the end of the Cold War, broke with this pattern and saw a cautious ex-
pansion of India’s democracy promotion activities abroad, driven by its changing role in 
                                                 
16  India has been a democratic state since the promulgation of its constitution in 1950, following its inde-
pendence from Britain in 1947. Democratic rule has been continuous – with the exception of a twenty-
one-month period of emergency rule in the mid-1970s, for which the ruling Congress Party was 
promptly punished at the polls. India’s democracy is not perfect: the list of shortcomings is long, rang-
ing from long-standing discrimination on the basis of caste or gender, to vastly unequal access to basic 
services such as health and education, and serious governance deficits, including pervasive corruption 
and an over-sized, under-performing bureaucracy. In the face of these challenges, public support for 
democracy has remained strong, but Indian democracy has also become more fractious and contentious, 
with more intense competition among different elites (which produces coalition governments more fre-
quently) and more frequent and vocal protests by marginalised and disadvantaged groups (such as the 
recent mass mobilisations against rape and ill-treatment of women). See also Chitalkar / Malone (2011). 
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regional and world affairs but always tempered by continued concerns with its own securi-
ty. 
Policies and initiatives 
One of the key factors in India’s decision to become more active in the democracy promo-
tion arena was its rapprochement with the United States following the end of the Cold War 
(Mohan 2007, 100; Cartwright 2009, 405), prompted by realignments in regional alliance 
patterns and the loss of its privileged partnership with the Soviet Union. At the request of 
the United States, India became a founding member of the Community of Democracies 
(CD), an intergovernmental organisation established in 2000 to support emerging democ-
racies and civil society world-wide, as well as the UN Democracy Caucus, which first met 
in 2004 to improve coordination among CD member countries at the United Nations. India 
also became the second-largest financial contributor to the UN Democracy Fund (after the 
United States), set up in 2005 by the UN Secretary-General to support democratisation 
efforts around the world. 
At the same time, India was careful not to align itself too closely with the United States, so 
as to maintain some margin to manoeuvre in its relations with other states and not to com-
promise its stature as an emerging power in its own right. Consequently, India refused to 
take on the leadership of the UN Democracy Caucus (Parthasarathy 2000), preferring to 
remain an ordinary member instead. Its role on the UN Democracy Fund, despite its sig-
nificant financial contribution, has also remained rather low-key. On a number of issues, 
India parted ways with the United States and other Western states, such as in its voting 
behaviour on human rights issues at the UN.17 
Within its own region, India has displayed the same ambiguity between principled support 
for democracy, on the one hand, and the pragmatic pursuit of its own interests, on the oth-
er. While certainly more activist than before and more ready to offer assistance to neigh-
bouring countries, India always made sure that its democracy support would not under-
mine other important foreign policy objectives, particularly shielding the country from 
political instability, hemming in regional competitors such as Pakistan, and countering the 
rise of China. Generally speaking, India’s democracy support has been stronger when its 
values and interests were aligned, such as in the case of Afghanistan or Nepal, and some-
what weaker when no important interests were at stake, as in Bhutan or the Maldives 
(Cartwright 2009). When India’s interests collided with its values, as in the case of My-
anmar, the former would prevail. 
Considered a “model case” by India’s external affairs ministry,18 Afghanistan has seen the 
most significant engagement by India to help build democracy in neighbouring countries 
(D’Souza 2013), as part of a comprehensive aid package that made Afghanistan the sec-
ond-largest recipient of Indian assistance after Bhutan (Chaturvedi 2012, 569). Supported 
activities have included the construction of a new parliament building, parliamentary 
                                                 
17  Piccone (2011) shows that India, just like Indonesia and South Africa, has often privileged the defence 
of national sovereignty over that of human rights in its votes on the UN Human Rights Council and in 
the UN General Assembly. Recent trends, however, are more favourable (Piccone 2011, 151). 
18  Global Democracy Initiative, http://www.gdi.nic.in (accessed 28 Jun. 2013). 
Promoting democracy. What role for the democratic emerging powers? 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 13 
training of Afghan officials in India, a contribution to a UNDP-financed project to help 
establish the Afghani legislature, as well as different forms of electoral assistance. While 
in line with India’s democratic values, these activities have also bolstered its strategic in-
terests, namely, to reduce the risk that fragility and instability in Afghanistan could spread 
to India itself – notably to Kashmir – and to balance the influence of its main regional ri-
val, Pakistan. 
In Nepal, India was more hesitant to engage at first, fearful that supporting Nepal’s Maoist 
opposition movement might encourage its own Naxalite insurgency. It only changed tack 
after substantial prodding by the United States and once it became clear that King Gya-
nendra’s defeat had become all but inevitable. As such, India’s engagement might appear 
as solely driven by “short-term stability concerns” (Destradi 2012, 286), but this overlooks 
the fact that India had also opposed the Nepalese monarch when he seized power in 2005, 
stopping its arms supplies in response (Cartwright 2009, 410). Subsequent to the restora-
tion of democracy in 2006, India provided substantial support to the peace process and 
significantly increased its overall assistance to Nepal (Chaturvedi 2012, 569). Overall, 
India’s actions appear consistent with its democratic principles although clearly, they also 
served its interest in regional stability, by creating a pathway for Nepal’s Maoist rebels to 
lay down their arms and integrate themselves into the political mainstream (with possible 
demonstration effects for India’s own Naxalite rebels). Resisting a possible increase in 
China’s influence was also an important consideration. 
Bhutan and the Maldives both saw more modest engagement by India in support of local 
democracy. In Bhutan, India’s democracy support – while significant – pales in compari-
son with its overall assistance to the country, traditionally its largest aid recipient. While 
undoubtedly strategically important, India’s interests in Bhutan are not threatened – by 
regional competitors or by the risk of internal disturbances spreading to India proper – 
making a larger engagement unnecessary. In the Maldives, India responded to requests for 
its expertise in building democratic institutions (Cartwright 2009, 413). While of lesser 
strategic importance, the Maldives presented a win-win scenario and an opportunity to 
burnish India’s image at little cost to itself. 
Myanmar, finally, is the clearest example of India’s strategic and security interests over-
ruling and cancelling out its support for democratic principles and human rights. After 
first opposing the military coup against Aung San Suu Kyi in 1988, India reversed course 
in the mid-1990s and – despite much criticism from Western governments and interna-
tional human rights groups – began to pursue a policy of “constructive engagement” with 
the Myanmar military regime, resulting in intensified cooperation in areas such as border 
management, energy security, and even defence (Mohan 2007, 111 f.; Cartwright 2009, 
413 ff.). The shift was motivated by several factors, among them concerns that the Myan-
mar military might shelter rebels from India’s restive north-eastern region, but had its 
main root in the fear that China might gain a foothold on India’s sensitive eastern flank. 
Intensified economic competition – expressed in India’s “Look East” strategy – was also a 
factor. Subsequent to the recent democratic opening in Myanmar, it remains to be seen if 
India will revert to playing a role as a democracy promoter (Roepstorff 2013).   
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Assessment and outlook 
India’s democracy promotion policies are best seen as part of its growing role in regional 
and world affairs. More assertive and interventionist than before, India has remained a 
cautious democracy promoter, often acting at the prodding of the United States but careful 
not to align itself too closely with the West. With the exception of Myanmar, India’s sup-
port for democracy has been genuine, although the country has never lost sight of its stra-
tegic interests, and the danger that changes in its regional environment could deepen exist-
ing cleavages in its own fractious polity. 
An even more assertive stance, building on its own experience of constructing a multi-
cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious democracy in a developmental context, would 
buttress India’s regional – and global – leadership ambitions. This might include greater 
Indian involvement in democracy promotion efforts beyond its own region, for example in 
Africa, where India has important economic interests. But for now at least, the potential 
costs are seen as too high, particularly the fear that a too-assertive stance on democracy 
and human rights would sharpen regional divisions and play into the hands of India’s sys-
temic rival, China. Such a stance would also attract attention to the many deficiencies in 
India’s own democratic system. 
Immediate changes to this panorama are not on the horizon (Mallavarapu 2010, 59; Faust / 
Wagner 2010, 3). Over time, such changes could come from a variety of sources, includ-
ing growing domestic pressures for improvements to India’s own democracy, which could 
also lead to calls for more consistency in its regional and global posture. But a true break 
in India’s current posture would require a less risk-prone regional environment and a less 
intense rivalry with China. 
3.2 Brazil: democratic champion or soft hegemon? 
Origins and drivers 
Brazil’s approach to supporting democracy elsewhere reflects a genuine commitment to 
democratic norms and principles stemming from its own transition to democratic rule in 
1985,19 but also an evolving sense of the country’s interests stemming from its growing 
role in regional and global affairs and a continuing insistence on the principle of non-
                                                 
19  Brazil returned to democracy in 1985, following an extended period of government by the military. 
After almost thirty years of uninterrupted democratic rule, and several changes of government from one 
political party to another, Brazil’s democracy can be regarded as stable and consolidated, although 
many problems remain. Despite its rapid economic rise over the past years, Brazil is still one of the 
most unequal countries in the world, with a large, inefficient bureaucracy and a serious corruption prob-
lem. Access to public services, such as education and health, is highly uneven and quality standards of-
ten low; in addition, there are important gaps in public infrastructures. Perhaps one of the biggest chal-
lenges to Brazil’s democracy is the existence of lawless zones in the favelas surrounding most big cit-
ies, where organised crime is rife and state authority tenuous. These deficiencies do not pose an imme-
diate threat to Brazil’s democratic system, but the mass demonstrations in the context of the FIFA 
(Fédération Internationale de Football Association) Confederations Cup in June 2013 were a clear sig-
nal that public support can no longer be taken for granted and that improvements to the quality of Bra-
zil’s democracy are urgently needed. 
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interference in other nations’ affairs. The tensions between these different drivers have 
manifested themselves in different ways during the successive administrations of Presi-
dents Cardoso, Lula and most recently, Dilma, but all post-authoritarian presidents in Bra-
zil have been keen to increase their country’s regional and global stature and to distinguish 
its democracy promotion policies from those of its powerful neighbour to the north, the 
United States. 
Brazil’s democracy promotion policies can be subdivided into three distinct phases. Under 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the country focused mostly on the defence of democratic 
legality and constitutions via regional and sub-regional organisations, particularly the Or-
ganization of American States (OAS). At the same time, Brazil refused to interfere when 
democratic principles were eroded in more subtle ways. During Luiz Inácio Lula da Sil-
va’s tenure, Brazil continued to intervene in cases of democratic interruptions in OAS 
member states, but began putting more emphasis on sub-regional organisations where 
Brazil had more clout. Non-interference also became the rationale for a shift in Brazil’s 
human rights posture at the United Nations, where it refused to condemn the practices of a 
number of autocratic regimes, voting against the West but siding with other emerging 
powers such as Indonesia or India. More recently, Dilma Rousseff returned Brazil to its 
traditional human rights posture at the UN, while otherwise following in the footsteps of 
her predecessors and pursuing Lula’s initiatives reaching out to other lusophone countries, 
particularly in Africa. 
Policies and initiatives 
Brazil’s post-authoritarian constitution contains a pledge to stand up for democratic norms 
and principles elsewhere, but it remained dormant until F. H. Cardoso became president in 
1995.20 The country’s changed approach especially to its hemispheric relations, which 
manifested itself in a number of interventions when the democratic order in OAS member 
states was threatened, is generally seen as a step forward in protecting and promoting the 
cause of democracy in the Americas (Santiso 2002 / 2003; Burges / Daudelin 2007; 
Burges 2008; Stuenkel 2013). Notably, Brazil stepped in to halt attempted coups in Para-
guay in 1999 and in Venezuela in 2002, and also intervened in several other crisis situa-
tions, such as again in Paraguay in 1999 and 2000. Working mostly through regional and 
sub-regional organisations, Brazil was instrumental in putting in place a set of legal rules 
and mechanisms to protect and defend the democratic order in the western hemisphere 
(Santiso 2003, 400).21 
At the same time, Brazil remained reluctant to intervene in what it considered the internal 
affairs of neighbouring countries, including procedural matters and challenges to demo-
cratic rules and principles that stopped just short of threatening the democratic order as 
such. For example, Brazil remained silent when Ecuadorian president Jamil Mahuad was 
                                                 
20  Article 4 of the Brazilian constitution mentions the “prevalence of human rights” and the “self-
determination of the peoples” as principles governing Brazil’s international relations. Previous presi-
dents José Sarney, Fernando Collor de Mello and Itamar Franco had maintained Brazil’s strict non-
interference posture, although José Sarney did agree to a reference to democracy being included in the 
preamble of a new OAS charter (Stuenkel 2013, 343). 
21  Including democracy clauses in the charters of the OAS, MERCOSUL (Mercado Comum do Sul) and 
UNASUL. 
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removed from his post in 2000 and refused to censure Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori 
for manipulating the presidential elections in his country in the same year, allowing him to 
remain in office.22 Brazil also defended Venezuela from external criticism regarding its 
democratic record, but never endorsed its alternative model of popular, “Bolivarian” de-
mocracy, which it shared with Ecuador, Bolivia, and others. In essence, Brazil insisted 
that determining the shape and functioning of their own democratic systems was up to the 
countries concerned, which amounted to a less interventionist approach to democracy 
promotion than that favoured by the United States. 
Brazil’s insistence on developing its own distinct approach to democracy promotion be-
came even more pronounced under the subsequent Lula administration.23 Continuing to 
intervene in constitutional and other crises that threatened the democratic order, such as in 
Bolivia in 2004 and 2005 (Burges 2008, 79) or in Ecuador in 2005 (Stuenkel 2013, 344), 
Brazil made greater use of bilateral channels or used sub-regional organisations where its 
influence was greater. In 2009, Brazil disagreed with the United States over the best way 
of dealing with the coup in Honduras, rallying many Latin American countries behind it.24 
Brazil also parted ways with the United States and other Western nations in its approach to 
left-leaning regimes in Venezuela, Bolivia, or Ecuador, insisting that their electoral prac-
tices, treatment of the judiciary and adversarial relations with the media and the political 
opposition were within democratic norms and therefore internal matters that required no 
outside interference. 
Under Lula’s presidency, Brazil also became more active internationally, taking over the 
lead of the UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004 and offering electoral assistance to 
other lusophone countries, namely Guinea-Bissau in 2004 and Timor Leste in 2011 
(Stuenkel 2013, 345). This more interventionist stance contrasted with Brazil’s human 
rights posture at the UN, where it opposed sanctions against authoritarian regimes both on 
the UN Human Rights Council and within the General Assembly (Piccone 2011), on the 
grounds that this would constitute an interference into their sovereign affairs. This posture, 
which arguably had its roots in Brazil’s unsuccessful campaign for a permanent seat at on 
the United Nations Security Council rather than a genuine shift in Brazil’s attitude towards 
democracy and human rights, was later rectified by Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff 
(Lins da Silva 2011). Dilma also signalled that Brazil was prepared to take even stronger 
action against breaches of the democratic order closer to home, suspending Paraguay from 
MERCOSUL (Mercado Comum do Sul) after the impeachment of President Fernando 
Lago, in concert with the leaders of Argentina and Uruguay (Stuenkel 2013, 345).   
                                                 
22  Brazil later did support the Inter-American Democratic Charter, aimed squarely at such interruptions of 
the constitutional order. 
23  See Almeida (2013) for an account of the recent evolution of Brazil’s foreign policy thinking, including 
the doctrines of “non-indifference” and “responsibility while protecting” developed under the Lula ad-
ministration. 
24  Following the coup against President Manuel Zelaya, the United States joined the rest of the region in 
ousting Honduras from the Organization of American States (OAS). But subsequently, it parted ways 
with Brazil and others in recognising the legitimacy of the elections that brought Porfirio Lobo to pow-
er, advocating Honduras’s reinstatement to the regional body (Lacey 2010). 
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Assessment and outlook 
Brazil’s commitment to democracy is generally seen as genuine, despite significant flaws 
in its democratic system. The country has done much to make democratic rules and prin-
ciples take root across the Latin America continent, particularly at the regional and sub-
regional level. At the same time, there is widespread agreement that Brazil has often fallen 
short in advancing these goals, within its own region as well as in the international arena. 
In particular, in focusing mainly on legal and procedural requirements, Brazil has done 
little to share its own rich experience in building democratic systems under developmental 
conditions, which includes devising inclusive economic and social policies and strategies 
favouring the participation of marginalised populations, such as the participatory budget 
experience in Porto Alegre. The reasons for this state of affairs, on the other hand, remain 
contested. 
Carlos Santiso, for example, sees the reasons for Brazil’s shortcomings in its adherence to 
two contradictory norms: its commitment to promote and protect democracy abroad, on 
the one hand, and its respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-
interference in other nations’ affairs, on the other. In order to become a more forceful de-
mocracy promoter, Brazil would need to “resolve the inherent tension” between these two 
opposing poles (Santiso 2003, 357). Burges and Daudelin challenge this explanation, ar-
guing that instead of “weaving democratic consolidation into its very fabric” (Burges / 
Daudelin 2007, 129), Brazil has always given preference to its national interests – gaining 
greater security and influence. Democracy promotion has been a Brazilian foreign policy 
priority only to the extent that it could be reconciled with these other, more vital goals, 
which explains Brazil’s lacklustre performance in this area. 
The view taken here is that while democracy promotion can and sometimes does clash 
with other national interests, it is not clear that “hard” interests will always take prece-
dence over more “aspirational” ones.25 Viewed in this light, democracy and its promotion 
can be seen as an integral part of Brazil’s national interests, which are being reconfigured 
to account for Brazil’s changing stature both within its own region and at the global level. 
Put differently, Brazil’s growing influence – and indeed, its security – depend to a large 
extent on the continued success of its own democratic model, which gives it substantial 
soft power and the ability to win over others to its own positions.26 Of course, this is not to 
say that Brazil by necessity will become a more energetic democracy supporter in the fu-
ture, nor that it will resist the impulse of promoting the interests of its growing economy at 
the expense of greater respect for democratic principles or human rights (Romero 2011). 
                                                 
25  Despite the impressive array of cases reviewed by Burges / Daudelin (2007), the evidence remains 
inconclusive. In the case of the 2009 coup in Honduras, for example, Brazil principled defence of de-
mocracy clashed with the United States’ more lenient stance. For some – notably the “Atlanticists” in 
Brazil’s foreign policy community – this would run counter to Brazil’s national interest of always hav-
ing good relations with its powerful neighbour to the north. 
26  Sean Burges, in a subsequent article (Burges 2008), argues that Brazil has had much success in estab-
lishing a Gramscian “consensual hegemony” in its region, which he differentiates explicitly from coer-
cive hegemony on neorealist terms (Burges 2008, 67). 
Gerd Schönwälder 
18 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
3.3 South Africa: from a sense of mission to a sense of drift 
Origins and drivers 
South Africa’s approach to promoting democracy beyond its own borders is marked by a 
commitment to democratic principles – even a sense of mission, at least initially – stem-
ming from its own transition to democratic rule in overcoming the previous apartheid re-
gime.27 But it is also influenced by the country’s economic and strategic interests in a re-
gion where it faces few security threats but many economic opportunities, as well as con-
siderations of how South Africa wants to fill its newly-acquired leadership role on the sub-
Saharan continent as well as beyond. Three distinct phases can be identified, which rough-
ly coincide with the administrations of the three immediate post-apartheid presidents: Nel-
son Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, and Jacob Zuma. 
Under Nelson Mandela, normative drivers clearly had the upper hand, resulting in a highly 
activist approach that saw South Africa assume a strong moral leadership role in promot-
ing democracy on the African continent. With Thabo Mbeki, as the costs and risks inher-
ent in this approach became clearer, this posture changed and South Africa became more 
concerned to act in concert with other African countries. Jacob Zuma continued most of 
the policies of his predecessor, but increasing concerns over deficiencies in South Africa’s 
own democratic system under his tenure shifted the emphasis away from South Africa’s 
role as an external democracy promoter. 
Policies and initiatives 
Even before his formal inauguration as South Africa’s first post-apartheid president, Nel-
son Mandela made it clear that the foreign policy of his country would henceforth be 
guided by human rights concerns. Writing in the journal Foreign Affairs, Nelson Mandela 
stressed that his administration would not just concentrate on building a new, multi-racial 
democracy within South Africa proper, following the long years of rule by the white mi-
nority, but that his country would be “at the forefront of global efforts to promote and fos-
ter democratic systems of government” (Mandela 1993, 87). 
Meant to draw inspiration from South Africa’s own success in overcoming the apartheid 
regime and aimed primarily at South Africa’s neighbours, both within the southern Afri-
can region and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, this policy proved difficult to implement 
in practice. Mandela’s diplomatic démarches to isolate Nigeria’s military government fol-
lowing the execution of activist Ken Saro Wiwa proved fruitless; if anything, they height-
                                                 
27  South Africa’s democratic transition in 1994 superseded the previous apartheid regime and was hailed 
as a milestone in the progress towards more democratic rule on the African continent. Since then, the 
country has adopted one of the world’s most progressive constitutions providing strong guarantees for 
human rights, revamped and reformed the institutional framework left behind by the apartheid regime, 
and improved the provision of basic services for its non-white majority. But progress in building a mul-
ti-racial “rainbow nation” has stalled. Inter-racial differences remain stark, to the point that they contin-
ue to define South Africa’s post-apartheid politics, and crime rates, while falling, remain high. Inequali-
ty between, but increasingly also within, racial groups is high, access to public services remains uneven 
and quality standards are often low, with education being a particular problem (OECD 2013, 2). Grow-
ing governance deficits likewise give rise to concerns. 
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ened South Africa’s own isolation among its fellow African states.28 South African efforts 
to resolve armed conflicts in its region, seen as a key step towards more democratic gov-
ernance, were equally unsuccessful. A direct military intervention in Lesotho ended in 
humiliating failure, and attempts to mediate between the warring parties in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) exposed a deep split within the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), pitting South Africa against Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia 
(Landsberg 2000, 112 ff.; Barber 2005, 1085 f.). In the end, South Africa had to realize 
that it could not impose its will on other African states, despite its vastly superior re-
sources, and that it had to find common ground with those that it wanted to influence. 
Perhaps more than anything, South Africa proved vulnerable to charges that it was break-
ing rank and doing the West’s bidding, and that its expansionary trade and economic poli-
cies were perpetuating the dependency relations created under the previous apartheid re-
gime.29 Mindful of these criticisms and keen to improve South Africa’s relations with its 
African peers, Nelson Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki, therefore toned down the rhet-
oric of South African leadership and exceptionalism30 and instead emphasised the value of 
African solidarity and “African renaissance.” This new attitude found its expression in the 
Mbeki administration’s flagship initiative, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) and its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), meant to promote better 
governance by way of voluntary, reciprocal reviews among NEPAD members them-
selves.31 In support of these initiatives, South Africa established a special funding win-
dow, the African Renaissance and Cooperation Fund, which, along with the continued 
promotion of democracy and good governance32 as well as conflict prevention, now also 
targeted socio-economic development and integration, as well as humanitarian assistance 
and human resource development. 
South Africa’s embrace of African solidarity also made it modify its approach to peace 
missions on the African continent: the country now preferred to act under the common 
roof of the African Union (AU) or the United Nations (UN), at the same time becoming 
one of the largest contributors. Lending credence to South Africa’s claim that it preferred 
to act in concert with fellow African states, this strategy was also meant to help South Af-
rica’s quest for a greater role at the UN – including a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council – both with limited success.33 Along with becoming more southern-focused, 
South Africa also became less interventionist in human rights matters, repeatedly parting 
ways with Western countries in the context of the UN General Assembly or the Human 
                                                 
28  Western states were equally unhelpful, continuing to buy Nigeria’s oil and refusing to institute sanc-
tions as Mandela had demanded (Barber 2005, 1084; Landsberg 2000, 112). 
29  See for example, Adebajo (2007) or Bond (2013). 
30  See Vale and Taylor (1999) for a more detailed discussion of this notion. 
31  That is, without any privileged role for South Africa and certainly without any participation by Western 
democracy promoters. The effectiveness of the APRM in driving democratic change has been ques-
tioned (Barber 2005, 1090). 
32  At the same time, the ANC softened its position on human rights, noting that there existed multiple 
interpretations and effectively subordinating human rights to broader concepts such as “democracy” or 
“good governance” (Barber 2005, 1087). 
33  With regard to the civil war in the DRC, South Africa was unable to overcome the split within SADC 
that continued to pit it against states such as Zimbabwe that favoured a military resolution (Barber 
2005, 1090 f.). At the UN, South Africa likewise was unable to make much headway. 
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Rights Council and refusing to sanction the human rights practices of authoritarian coun-
tries (The Economist, 14 October 2010; Piccone 2011). 
With regard to its immediate neighbours, South Africa likewise displayed a much more 
lenient attitude than before, particularly in the case of Zimbabwe, where it tolerated obvi-
ous human rights abuses by the ruling Mugabe regime and, arguably, failed to deploy its 
real influence in order to hasten democratic change. The reasons for this stance – while not 
entirely clear – seem to go beyond pure interest calculations, especially since South Afri-
ca’s interests in this instance did not all point in the same direction. Specifically, fears for 
a repeat of the Nigeria episode and the resulting isolation of South Africa within SADC 
and the broader African community, as well as for political instability surrounding the 
sensitive land issue spreading to South Africa proper, were counter-balanced by an equally 
large risk that – absent a solution to the Zimbabwean crisis – increased migration to South 
Africa would heighten xenophobia at home, where violence surrounding regional migrants 
was already a significant threat to human security. In addition, too much leniency towards 
the Zimbabwean regime risked damaging South Africa’s international standing as a cham-
pion of human rights and good governance, with potential ripple effects also for its eco-
nomic interests. In the end, ideological motivators, particularly the wish to maintain “Afri-
can solidarity” in the face of persistent criticism from Western states, may have proved the 
decisive factor.34 
Hopes that Thabo Mbeki’s successor, Jacob Zuma, would return South Africa to its earli-
er, much stronger position in defence of human rights and democracy were quickly 
dashed. Instead, the Zuma administration continued along the main lines developed under 
Mbeki, placing a premium on maintaining non-confrontational relations with fellow Afri-
can states, collectively defending against outside interference in human rights matters, 
particularly by the International Court of Justice (Thipanyane 2011, 3f.), while continuing 
its non-interference stance at the United Nations, and maintaining South Africa’s non-
confrontational, if not particularly effective, stance towards Zimbabwe.35 Along with ideo-
logical and programmatic affinities, this “pragmatic” attitude by the Zuma administration 
was motivated in part by a concern not to jeopardise the ongoing expansion of South Afri-
ca’s economy on the continent, particularly in light of growing criticism of South Africa’s 
increasing economic dominance. In addition, the mounting and increasingly visible defi-
ciencies in South Africa’s own democratic system – mentioned just above – made it more 
difficult to preach the virtues of democratic governance and respect for human rights to 
others. 
Assessment and outlook 
South Africa’s approach to external democracy promotion has seen significant changes 
over the years. What started as an activist approach driven by normative considerations 
soon became a more restrained posture in which interest calculations – both strategic and 
                                                 
34  See Barber (2005) and Nathan (2005) for a more detailed discussion. 
35  The establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), which is meant to 
absorb the African Renaissance and Cooperation Fund, did constitute a new development. Promoting 
democracy outside South Africa remains one of the agency’s goals, but it remains to be seen whether 
institutional changes will have an impact on actual policies. See Vickers (2012). 
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economic – played a larger role than before. The drivers behind these shifts have been 
varied: apart from a genuine commitment to democratic principles and human rights 
stemming from the transition period – which persists although may be weakening – they 
are related to a more realistic assessment of South Africa’s capabilities to influence its 
neighbours, as well as of the costs and benefits associated with democracy promotion pol-
icies in a fairly unreceptive environment. The embracement of the ideas of African soli-
darity and African renaissance likewise had a dampening effect on South Africa’s democ-
racy promotion posture, leading the country to become more lenient in the face of human 
rights violations, particularly in neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe. 
South Africa has clearly adapted its democracy promotion stance to external influences, 
but domestic developments have also played an important role. Especially worrying have 
been the growing corruption and mismanagement in the public sector, which has put a 
strain on the democratic fabric, and the disregard for democratic governance principles 
shown by the ruling ANC government itself, for example, in trying to silence its critics by 
imposing stricter controls on the independent media and the judiciary (Roth 2013, 159 ff.). 
Taken together, these developments have harmed South Africa’s credibility as a supporter 
of democracy both within and beyond its own borders. 
The outlook for the coming years is unclear. Much will depend on the future evolution of 
South Africa’s political system, which has shown signs of moving away from the ideals of 
the “rainbow nation” and towards a form of one-party rule, as well as the strength of the 
country’s civil society, particularly pro-democracy groups within civil society and the me-
dia. What role South Africa will want to play in regional and global settings – particularly 
the extent to which it will want to pursue its own, especially economic, interests – will 
likewise be important.  
3.4 Indonesia: a giant with feet of clay? 
Origins and drivers 
Indonesia began to promote democracy beyond its own borders only once its own transi-
tion was more secure, and its new identity as a modern, democratic Muslim nation more 
firmly established.36 The respective policies were driven, initially, by a desire to improve 
Indonesia’s international image which had suffered in the wake of post-transition turmoil 
and the country’s heavy-handed intervention in East Timor, but also by a genuine com-
mitment to democratic values and principles stemming from its own transition, as well as 
Indonesia’s own self-interest in both internal and external political stability, given its size 
                                                 
36  Indonesia became a democratic state only in 1998, having long insisted on the benefits of its authoritar-
ian development model. Its democratic transition was precipitated by the Asian financial crisis of the 
previous year, which led to the collapse of the long-standing authoritarian regime of President Suharto 
and subsequent political reforms (“reformasi”). Following a rather rocky post-transition phase, Indone-
sia’s democratic regime stabilised after a few years and subsequently became a champion for more de-
mocracy also in its surrounding region. While benefitting from strong support by key policymakers, as 
well as influential civil society groups and media outlets, Indonesia’s young democracy is still plagued 
by numerous deficiencies, among them “corruption, terrorism, communal tensions, weak law-
enforcement and, more recently, growing religious intolerance” (Sukma 2011, 118). 
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and exposure as a far-flung island nation. A first phase under President Megawati Sukar-
noputri saw a heavy emphasis on regional organisations, particularly the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), resulting in the reform of its charter and the estab-
lishment of a new human rights commission. In a second, more recent phase under Presi-
dent Susilo Bambang Yudhuyone, Indonesia proved willing to also go beyond regional 
instruments and to push for more democracy even in the absence of a regional consensus, 
using unilateral initiatives such as the Bali Democracy Forum. Still reluctant to interfere 
directly in the affairs of neighbouring states, Indonesia now seems somewhat less wedded 
to the non-interference principle, long a mainstay of its foreign policy. 
Policies and initiatives 
The onset of Indonesia’s democracy promotion policies was preceded by a period imme-
diately following the transition to democratic rule, during which the country took steps to 
repair its battered international image and to entrench and consolidate its still-fragile dem-
ocratic regime (Sukma 2011, 111 f.). The post-transition period in Indonesia had proved to 
be a fairly messy affair, with numerous new entrants into the political arena (Laksmana 
2011, 159), bickering and infighting among the elites, and concerns – particularly in the 
West – over the growing influence of Islamist movements on Indonesia’s polity. Subse-
quent administrations therefore took steps to project a democratic image of the country to 
the outside world – for example, by signing on to a number of international human rights 
treaties – and to erase the memories of Indonesia’s ill-fated, and ultimately unsuccessful 
intervention to stop East Timor’s independence movement. At the same time, they en-
deavoured to entrench a new democratic identity among the country’s citizens, premised 
on the notion that policymaking – including the conduct of Indonesia’s foreign affairs – 
would now be subject to greater public scrutiny and that all relevant actors would have 
their place, provided they abided by democratic rules and principles.37 
Indonesia’s first real foray into the democracy promotion arena came with its initiative to 
reform ASEAN, which had some success despite repeated set-backs along the way (Dosch 
2008; Sukma 2011, 114; Anwar 2010, 132 ff.). Beginning in 2003 with the ASEAN Con-
cord II (Bali Concord II), which for the first time mentioned democracy and rights as core 
values of ASEAN, Indonesia was the driving force behind the revision of the ASEAN 
Charter in 2007, which now listed respect for and protection of human rights among its 
fundamental principles. The revised charter also provided for the creation of an ASEAN 
human rights body, which was finally established in 2009, albeit with a much weaker 
mandate than what the Indonesian government – and pro-democracy actors within Indone-
sia’s civil society – had originally envisaged. 
Despite these qualified successes, Indonesian policymakers became increasingly frustrated 
with the inherent limitations in ASEAN’s human rights and democracy regime, particular-
ly the lack of an effective sanctions mechanism and that of a mandate to promote – and 
not just protect – human rights and democratic principles. These limitations became glar-
                                                 
37  Anwar notes that within the administration as well, there were now multiple “power centres” influenc-
ing foreign policy decisions. The power of Indonesia’s House of Representatives (DPR), in particular, 
had “increased exponentially” (Anwar 2010, 128 ff.) and now rivalled that of the Foreign Affairs minis-
try. See also Laksmana (2011, 163 f.). 
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ingly obvious in ASEAN’s inability to put pressure on Myanmar to enact political re-
forms, due in large part to the organisation’s continued reluctance to interfere in the do-
mestic affairs of its member states. As a result, Indonesian policymakers and influential 
opinion leaders began calling for a “post-ASEAN” foreign policy (Anwar 2010, 135) or at 
least an alternate route to pursue their pro-democracy objectives, which in 2008 gave birth 
to the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF). A unilateral initiative of the Indonesian government, 
the BDF seeks to promote cooperation on peace and democracy through dialogue and the 
sharing of experiences and best practices. Now in its sixth year, the forum has attracted 
high-level participation by heads of state and government but little in the way of concrete 
results or lessons learned (Kleden 2012). 
Assessment and outlook 
Indonesia’s commitment to democracy and its promotion abroad appears firmly rooted in 
pro-democratic value orientations that are broadly shared among key policymakers – in-
cluding an assertive and vocal legislature – and reinforced by a critical public sphere that 
comprises activist civil society groups and attentive media outlets. Promoting democracy 
also appears to be in the best interest of Indonesia’s young democratic regime, not in the 
realist sense of projecting its economic or military power at the expense of surrounding 
states, but as a means of enhancing regional collaboration with the goal of containing the 
many internal and external sources of instability that the country faces. Conceiving of its 
interests in this way goes hand-in-hand with Indonesia’s emerging identity as a democratic 
power which seeks not to use force but to rally others around shared goals.38 Enacting this 
identity via practical foreign policy, however, is still a “work in progress”. 
A frequent criticism of Indonesia’s democracy promotion record is that the country stays 
true to its principles within in its own region, but reneges on them in the international 
realm. Indonesia’s voting record at the United Nations is indeed questionable: on several 
occasions, the country has refused to condemn the human rights practices of states such as 
North Korea, Iran, or even Myanmar, siding with authoritarian regimes instead of the 
West (Piccone 2011, 143). Observers have attributed this attitude to continuities in Indo-
nesia’s foreign policy, notably its traditional defence of the non-interference principle,39 a 
lack of attention by domestic civil society actors and the media to UN matters, as well as, 
more fundamentally, to serious doubts on the part of Indonesia’s rulers regarding the ef-
fectiveness of public “naming and shaming” campaigns favoured by the West. Even with-
in its own region, Indonesia has often tempered its critique notably of Myanmar – albeit 
taking a more critical stance than fellow ASEAN countries – in the hope of retaining some 
leverage over the Myanmar junta. In addition, Indonesia, just like other ASEAN countries, 
has not wanted to drive Myanmar into the arms of extra-regional powers – particularly 
China but also India – which are keen to increase their influence in the region at ASEAN’s 
expense. 
                                                 
38  There has been some debate as to whether the country’s emerging democratic identity is genuinely new 
(Sukma 2011, 112 ff.; Anwar 2010, 132 f.) or rather, a different expression of a national identity – and 
corresponding national interests – that have always had a moral foundation (Laksmana 2011, 159). 
39  As mentioned, there are indications that this position is softening. Sukma (2011, 113) for example, 
quotes Indonesia’s foreign minister Wirajuda as saying that “violations of human rights in a country 
can no longer be seen as internal matters. ASEAN should not hide behind the principle of non-
interference.” 
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A related criticism is that Indonesia’s democracy promotion policies have failed to pro-
duce tangible results: its focus on reforming ASEAN in particular had yielded little more 
than a string of pronouncements and “a mile-long paper trail” (Suryodiningrat 2004). This 
would not do justice to the real transformation of the organisation over the past years – 
previously a club of autocracies or semi-autocracies, all of which now recognise democra-
cy and respect for human rights as foundational principles – but it is true that past 
achievements are no longer enough. ASEAN is in dire need of an effective sanctions re-
gime that could be applied to punish breeches of democracy and human rights violations 
in the region, possibly modelled on similar provisions in the charter of the OAS or the 
European Union (EU) treaties. Indonesia, in turn, could take a stronger stance against of-
fending states, within its own region and beyond, distancing itself further from the non-
interference principle. At the same time, it could start to offer bilateral assistance, drawing 
on its own experiences in building democratic institutions and benefitting from its vocal 
and active civil society. Obviously, addressing the many deficiencies in its own democrat-
ic polity – mentioned earlier – would help to make such assistance more useful and en-
hance Indonesia’s credibility. Without such steps, criticisms that Indonesia’s policies are 
more about “democracy projection” than actual promotion (Sukma 2011, 122) and that 
ASEAN has failed to progress from accepting democracy to actively enforcing and pro-
moting it (Dosch 2008, 542) will continue to ring true. 
3.5 Turkey: a model under siege 
Origins and drivers 
Turkey differs in two important ways from the other democratic emerging powers dis-
cussed in this paper:40 First, its transition to democratic rule is inextricably linked with its 
longstanding ambition to become a member of the European Union. Turkey’s membership 
perspective has provided it with a powerful external incentive to adopt the same basic 
rules concerning democratic governance and respect for human rights that all EU members 
have to abide by; at the same time, it has provided an “anchor” for those within Turkey 
who had been pushing for political and economic reforms for a long time.41 Second, de-
spite Turkey’s qualified success in consolidating and developing its young democratic 
regime, as well as an increasingly pro-active foreign policy, the country has yet to develop 
                                                 
40  Turkey’s transition to democratic rule took place in the year 1983, following a string of military coups 
that had regularly interrupted the country’s democratic constitutionality in previous decades. But it was 
only in recent years, subsequent to the 2002 electoral victory of the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP), that Turkey’s rulers were able to truly overcome the military’s overweening influence over the 
country’s civilian affairs (Taspinar 2011). Helped by a sustained economic boom and an expansion of 
Turkey’s economy to the surrounding region, successive AKP governments were able not only to con-
sign the Turkish military to the barracks, but to develop a form of government that for the first time 
seemed to marry modern representative democracy with Turkey’s Islamic traditions. More recently, the 
sustainability and indeed the viability of this model has come into doubt, following a wave of popular 
protests that have pitted reformers against traditionalists, revealing the depth of the remaining fissures 
within Turkish society, as well as the need to pursue Turkey’s democratic reform process. 
41  The actual membership negotiations between the European Union and Turkey, which were just restart-
ed on 5 November 2013 after a long hiatus, have proved to be difficult and several chapters have not 
even been opened. 
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actual policies to promote democracy beyond its own borders. Instead, Turkey has relied 
mostly on passive demonstration and diffusion effects, notwithstanding the considerable 
attention that the “Turkish model” has received particularly in the Middle East and North 
Africa. 
Policies and initiatives 
Turkey’s foreign policy was long held back by its colonial past, making countries in its 
region, especially those that had been part of the Ottoman empire, suspicious of any per-
ceived rise in Turkey’s power and influence. This situation changed with the advent of the 
AKP government’s (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: Justice and Development Party) “zero 
problems” foreign policy, spearheaded by foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (Davutoğlu 
2010, 2012). Designed to settle all outstanding issues between Turkey and its neighbours, 
and predicated on a new commitment to democracy, international partnerships, and the 
use of soft power instead of military force, the new policy was also an expression of Tur-
key’s ambition to play a larger role in its region than before, albeit by different means. At 
the same time, the new policy was firmly anchored in Turkey’s longstanding strategic ori-
entation towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU, raising ex-
pectations for increased collaboration between Turkey and the West.42 
Putting Turkey’s relations with its neighbours on a new footing, its new foreign policy 
also facilitated the further regional expansion of its economy, based on an economic boom 
that had started in the mid-1980s and produced a more than ten-fold increase in per-capita 
incomes, in tandem with the rise of the manufacturing and service economies and the rela-
tive decline of the agricultural sector (Kirişci 2011, 37). Along with the structural trans-
formation of its economy – which also produced profound social changes, notably the rise 
of a new middle class – Turkey’s regional trade increased exponentially and its economic 
operators – among them supermarket chains, transport or construction companies – came 
to own important stakes in the economies of surrounding nations (Kirişci 2011, 38). To-
gether with the political transformations resulting from its embracement of democracy and 
its new, more conciliatory foreign policy, Turkey’s resounding economic success pro-
duced powerful demonstration and diffusion effects that were not lost on surrounding 
states. 
Most of these effects have been indirect and not the result of deliberate policies – as men-
tioned, Turkey has no democracy promotion policies as such. Rather, the living example 
of a Muslim state that had – seemingly – managed to transform its political system, reori-
ent its external relations, as well as jumpstart its stagnant economy proved highly inspira-
tional for many in the Middle East grappling with similar challenges (Al-Azm 2011). At 
the same time, the interactions between Turkish business people and their counterparts 
from neighbouring countries, the increasing popularity of Turkish TV and other media 
throughout the region, as well as the growing number of academic exchanges – Turkey is 
receiving an increasing number of foreign students – have brought Turkey’s neighbours 
                                                 
42  See, for example, Segal (2011) or Saunders (2011). Kahraman (2011) warns that in the absence of fur-
ther “normative reconciliation” with the EU and continued progress in Turkey’s accession process, the 
two may drift apart and end up competing, as opposed to cooperating, with one another. 
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face-to-face with the effects of the country’s internal transformations (Kirişci 2011, 39 
ff.). 
When Turkey did intervene more directly in regional affairs, it was to advance peace pro-
cesses or to mediate and help resolve regional sources of conflict, not to promote democ-
ratisation per se. For example, Turkey tried to help improve relations between Palestinians 
and Israelis, or Shias and Sunnis in Iraq, and it made efforts to address the Cyprus ques-
tion or its fraught relations with Armenia.43 These initiatives, and Turkey’s more concilia-
tory approach to its neighbourhood overall, were well received but fell short of the de-
clared goal of “zero problems”; in fact they created some new ones. For example, Turkey 
has been accused of being partisan – such as on the Palestine conflict, resulting in a rapid 
deterioration of its relations with Israel after a brief honeymoon – or of getting too close to 
radical Islamist groups such as Hizbollah or Hamas. Its economic expansion was criticised 
for potentially harming the economic prospects of other states.44 Following its rapproche-
ment with Syria, a long-time regional rival, relations quickly deteriorated as Syria’s civil 
war spread. And while some saw Turkey’s stronger focus on the Middle Eastern region as 
an indication that the country was loosening its Western foreign policy anchor (Cornell 
2012), more recent belligerent pronouncements by Prime Minister Erdoğan – on Greek-
Cypriot and Israeli gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean or on the country’s own 
Kurdish problem – raised the spectre of Turkey renewing its great-power ambitions under 
the veil of greater regional integration (The Economist, 5 November 2011). 
Assessment and outlook 
A more deliberate policy to promote democracy in the region would help clarify Turkey’s 
stance on the issues just mentioned. While the country did, overall, side with the pro-
democracy movements during the Arab Spring, after some hesitation and sacrificing some 
carefully-wrought improvements in relations to key regional powers such as Syria, Turkey 
could do more to coordinate its efforts with those of Western powers, particularly the Eu-
ropean Union given their commonality of interests (Kahraman 2011, 712). Providing more 
targeted assistance to pro-democracy actors in the region, drawing on Turkey’s own rich 
experience particularly in combining representative democracy and political Islam, might 
also be more effective than simply relying on passive demonstration and diffusion effects. 
Critically, Turkey’s credibility and effectiveness in doing so depends on making further 
efforts to strengthen and develop its own democratic system, whose imperfections became 
evident in the context of the Gezi Park protests (Schönwälder 2013), and on taming the 
autocratic reflexes of some of its rulers (Koplow / Cook 2012). The fact that Turkey’s de-
mocracy is still a “work in progress” may have contributed to its attractiveness to sur-
rounding countries (Kirişci 2011, 40), but standing still or moving backwards would cer-
tainly not.   
                                                 
43  As well, Turkey made efforts to mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan, between Bosnia and Ser-
bia, and between Iran and the West (Kirişci 2011, 43). For more detail, see Altunışık and Martin 
(2011), Kanat (2012) and Özcan (2011). 
44  Kalaycioglu (2011) asserts as much, referring to Turkey’s expanding economic and business links with 
Africa. 
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4 Conclusions 
This paper started out by asking why – in the face of an apparent long-term, strategic in-
terest in promoting democracy – the democratic emerging powers (India, Brazil, South 
Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey) have been rather cautious in supporting actual democrati-
sation processes beyond their own borders. It provided a first answer based on a brief 
analysis of the motivations underlying such policies: while democratic states do seem to 
have a well-founded interest in more democratic surroundings, they also face a number of 
obstacles and constraints. Specifically, democratisation processes, at least in their early 
stages, can heighten the risk of political instability, with possible repercussions at home. 
Furthermore, support for such processes can stiffen the resolve of autocratic regimes or 
create inroads for competing authoritarian powers, which can harm vital economic and 
security interests. Respect for the non-intervention principle, traditionally a major plank in 
the foreign policies of the democratic emerging powers, can act as a further break. 
These are major hurdles, but they do not impede the formulation and enactment of pro-
democracy foreign policies, at least not necessarily. As opposed to some of the literature 
on the subject, this paper did not share the view that pragmatic, “realist” policy drivers 
will (almost) always gain the upper hand, given the primacy of states’ interests in security 
and survival.45 Rather, it started from the premise that foreign policy choices – including 
whether or not to support democracy elsewhere – are rooted in a complex interplay of val-
ue orientations, the interests of major societal groups, as well as structures of power and 
representation, resulting in what can be termed “state preferences” (Moravcsik 2008, 
2010). Importantly, this view implies that foreign policy choices are dynamic and open to 
change – since they are not based on state interests considered static and immutable – al-
though clearly, this change can work in different directions. 
By and large, the case studies presented in this paper bear out this view. With the partial 
exception of Turkey, all five countries have enacted and pursued policies to promote de-
mocracy beyond their own borders, albeit with different emphases and different levels of 
priority, and not necessarily using this precise term. Even Turkey has reached out to its 
immediate neighbourhood, taking initiatives to help mitigate and resolve conflicts. All five 
democratic emerging powers have experienced tensions between normative policy drivers, 
pushing for more and more decisive initiatives to further democratic principles and human 
rights, and interest-based ones, often calling for “pragmatic” accommodation with neigh-
bouring autocracies and restraint in the face of systemic competition with large authoritar-
ian powers. Despite some limited collaboration in some cases, all five democratic emerg-
ing powers have mostly kept their distance from Western democracy promoters, some-
times insisting on regional or “southern” solidarity over human rights concerns. And final-
ly, all five democratic emerging powers have faced capacity and financial shortages, 
which limited the reach and effectiveness of their policies. 
Notwithstanding these similarities, there are also some crucial differences, in terms of the 
level of engagement in favour of democracy, the reach and range of pro-democracy poli-
cies pursued, and the management of trade-offs between such policies and broader eco-
nomic and security interests. Four key factors stand out in explaining these differences:  
                                                 
45  Likewise, the paper does not endorse the view that it is somehow “natural” and inescapable for liberal 
democracies to promote democracy elsewhere. 
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• First, recent memories of successful democratic transitions processes clearly play a 
role in shaping subsequent democracy promotion policies. Indonesia, the most recent 
entrant into the democracy promotion field among the five countries examined, has al-
so been one of the most vocal, certainly within its own region. In Brazil, whose transi-
tion dates further back, or in India, which has been democratic since 1950, this has 
been much less of a factor. 
• Second, the relative strength or weakness of the democratic fabric – which includes 
legislatures and parliamentary committees, civil society groups, and the media – can 
have a similar effect. In Indonesia, a pro-active legislature, supported by civil society 
groups and an alert media, has helped to keep democracy promotion issues on the po-
litical agenda. In South Africa, by contrast, worries over domestic governance deficits 
have increasingly drawn attention away from external democracy promotion efforts. 
Domestic democracy deficits, however, can also lead to a reinvigoration of the demo-
cratic fabric when they provoke a public response, as recently seen in Brazil in the 
context of the demonstrations surrounding the Confederations Cup, in India with re-
gard to the protest against gender violence, or in Turkey with respect to the Gezi Park 
protests. 
• Third, the presence of significant security challenges, especially in conjunction with 
systemic competition with authoritarian powers, militates against external democracy 
support, even when such a stance corresponds with long-term strategic interests. India 
is a case in point: It had to carefully calibrate its efforts to support democracy in 
neighbouring states, so as not to exacerbate existing differences with regional rivals – 
especially Pakistan – and to limit the influence of extra-regional competitors – particu-
larly China. These challenges are less acute in the case of the other democratic emerg-
ing powers examined, although both Indonesia and South Africa are facing growing 
Chinese influence in their regions. 
• Fourth, strong economic interests and the potential for expansion into the markets of 
neighbouring states can reinforce pressures for pragmatic accommodation with au-
thoritarian regimes. Brazil, South Africa and Turkey in particular have been facing 
such pressures, given their already dominant positions in their respective regional 
economies and obvious interests to expand further. If gone unchecked, such interests 
can marginalise other policy concerns, notably democratisation and greater respect for 
human rights.46 They can also lead to charges of economic dominance and disregard 
for the legitimate interests of smaller, less powerful countries. 
Clearly, similar influences shape the democracy support policies also of older, more estab-
lished democracy promoters, such as the United States or Europe, but they apply to the 
democratic emerging powers in different ways. These differences appear most starkly with 
regard to the first two factors, which relate mostly to the internal dynamics of the coun-
tries concerned. Memories of democratic transitions are generally more recent in the dem-
ocratic emerging powers, giving them greater prevalence also for foreign policy making. 
But at the same time, and for the same reason, democratic fabrics tend to be weaker and 
less firmly rooted, which has the opposite effect. Security challenges and economic inter-
ests, by contrast – which are rooted chiefly in external environments – produce conflicts 
                                                 
46  Despite the fact that the rule of law and better governance overall can play a key role also in improved 
economic performance. 
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between competing goals that are common to older and newer democracy promoters 
alike.47 Arguably, though, these conflicts are more keenly felt in the latter: Generally 
speaking, the democratic emerging powers are more vulnerable to security challenges in 
their immediate neighbourhoods and have fewer alternatives to pursuing economic oppor-
tunities in their own regions than would be the case for more established democracy pro-
moters. 
What emerges from the cases examined is a complex picture, with the democracy support 
provided by the democratic emerging powers set against other, often conflicting foreign 
policy concerns. While the same four factors also shape the democracy support policies of 
older, more established democracy promoters such as the United States or Europe, they 
apply in different ways to the democratic emerging powers. In terms of the three basic 
options explained earlier – inaction coupled with a reliance on passive demonstration and 
diffusion effects; cautious support for democratisation processes elsewhere but not at the 
expense of other foreign policy interests; and more proactive democracy support despite 
the risks and dangers involved – it is clear that the countries studied mostly opted for the 
second one. Still, the fact that they provided such support at all remains significant: faced 
with considerable risks and the potential of damaging their other foreign policy interests, 
they could easily have opted to do nothing.48 
Clearly, though, there is much unused potential. For one, the democratic emerging powers 
have not been particularly innovative in their choice of methods. Frequently, they have 
resorted to similar instruments and modalities as Western democracy promoters, such as 
electoral assistance or institution-building, in addition to strengthening the democracy 
provisions embedded in regional organisations or helping to end violent conflicts as a pre-
condition for subsequent democratisation. While a relative lack of conditions and a more 
demand-driven approach may have resulted in greater acceptance on the part of democra-
tising countries (D’Souza 2013), it is not clear whether this approach also made the sup-
port provided more relevant and effective. 
In fact, the reluctance on the part of the democratic emerging powers to become more 
deeply involved in the affairs of neighbouring countries may have deprived them of what 
is perhaps their greatest asset, namely, the ability to bring their own experience in building 
democratic political systems to bear on ongoing democratisation processes there. For ex-
ample, there have been few, if any, deliberate attempts to make use of India’s or South 
Africa’s experience in building multi-ethnic and multi-racial democracies, Brazil’s con-
siderable track record in opening its political system to popular participation,49 or Tur-
                                                 
47  See Grimm / Leininger (2012) for a more detailed discussion of conflicting objectives in democracy 
promotion. 
48  As mentioned, Turkey did mostly pursue the first option, as did India in the period following its inde-
pendence. 
49  Brazil did make certain “social technologies” – tested approaches to address developmental problems in 
areas such as health and education – available to others (Marques 2013), which might be considered an 
example of “embedded” democracy support. Since it is notoriously difficult to separate such forms of 
support from more technical development assistance, and even harder to distinguish their respective 
impacts, this article has concentrated on more explicit and targeted forms of democracy support only. 
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key’s long-running experiment in marrying Islam with representative democracy.50 As to 
furthering alternative, more context-sensitive forms of democracy that would go beyond 
the standard model of western-style representative democracy, the cases studies yielded 
hardly any evidence at all.51 
Changes to the present status quo, and a shift to a more proactive stance on external de-
mocracy promotion, could come from a variety of internal and external sources, which, 
taken together, could provoke a shift in “state preferences” as explained above. As to do-
mestic factors, greater pressure from domestic pro-democracy constituencies and more 
transparency in foreign policymaking, obliging governments to lay open the calculations 
behind their foreign policy decisions, would militate in favour of a more proactive stance 
on external democracy promotion. There are promising signs pointing in this direction – 
witness the recent popular protests against deficiencies in domestic political systems in 
Brazil or India.52 At the same time, there are worrying trends pointing the other way: the 
clampdown by the Turkish government on the Gezi Park protests may indicate a harden-
ing of the regime, while growing governance deficits in South Africa could signal a weak-
ening commitment of the regime to democratic rules and principles. 
On the external front, changes in both regional and global contexts are presenting the 
democratic emerging powers with some critical choices as to how to fill their new regional 
and global leadership roles. Within their own regions, they need to decide if they want to 
pursue their own interests first and foremost, becoming new regional hegemons,53 or in-
stead take on the role of regional representatives and champions. Defining and defending 
regional interests, including those of smaller, less powerful states, and of disadvantaged 
populations within them, has not been an overriding objective for the democratic emerging 
powers to date. Much the same can be said about the forging of stronger links among the 
democratic emerging powers themselves, where few advances have been made (Alden / 
Vieira 2005; Graham 2011; Stephen 2012). 
Globally, the democratic emerging powers need to decide how they see their relationship 
with the West, and how they want to relate to other emerging powers, especially authori-
tarian ones such as China. Their reluctance to make common cause with the West is un-
derstandable, especially since promoting democracy was used as a pretext to justify the 
illegal war in Iraq. But in their efforts to differentiate themselves, the democratic emerging 
powers have also made some troubling choices, particularly regarding their voting behav-
iour on human rights issues in the context of the UN or in turning a blind eye to human 
rights violations and anti-democratic actions in neighbouring states, in the name of south-
                                                 
50  Indonesia, for its part, never saw itself as a “Muslim democracy” and resisted the temptation of infusing 
its political system with religious elements, despite its large, mostly Muslim population (Sugiono 
2013). 
51  As mentioned, Brazil shielded Venezuela from external criticism regarding its democratic record, but 
never endorsed its alternative model of popular, “Bolivarian” democracy. 
52  Kurlantzick (2013) recently argued that in Venezuela, Pakistan, and Taiwan trend lines point in the 
opposite direction, with the middle classes turning against democracy. 
53  Burges (2008) argues that Brazil is already acting as a “consensual” hegemon in its region. However, as 
pointed out by Wolff and Wurm (2011, 86), “consensual” hegemony – in the Gramscian sense – cannot 
be equated with simple domination, precisely because it requires a measure of consent in order to be ef-
fective. 
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ern solidarity. These choices, which have sometimes blurred the line between emerging 
democracies and emerging autocracies, carry significant risks as well, notably that of un-
dermining the democratic emerging powers’ claim to democratic legitimacy.54 
These issues are critically important since they provide an important source of legitimacy 
for the democratic emerging powers. Arguably, these countries are too weak to impose 
their leadership in their respective regions – not to mention at the global level – simply by 
projecting their economic or military might. As emerging economies, their capacity to 
provide direct material benefits to others is likewise rather limited.55 In these circumstanc-
es, they need to rely on other resources to ensure their legitimacy. One such resource is 
precisely their standing as emerging democracies, resulting in a kind of legitimacy that is 
rooted not just in the continuing appeal of the democratic idea as such, but also in a 
demonstrated capacity to better address developmental challenges and resolve internal 
tensions and conflicts of interests by way of democratic governance. A key difference to 
authoritarian development models, building and nurturing this capacity is critical for the 
democratic emerging powers’ ability to lead by example, and to offer assistance to others 
in building more democratic systems. 
There is a role for others, notably Western democracy promoters, in influencing these pro-
cesses, but they should not expect to be able to “outsource” democracy promotion, hoping 
that the democratic emerging powers will simply step in their shoes. “Naming and sham-
ing” these countries, be it for flaws in their own democratic record or for leniency towards 
authoritarian governments, will likely not have much effect, either. Rather, the emphasis 
should lie on creating true partnerships, in which both sides would play to their own spe-
cific advantages: familiarity with local contexts and more recent experience in building 
democratic systems in third-world conditions in the case of the democratic emerging pow-
ers, and greater depth of democratic practice, greater and more varied expertise in support-
ing democracy abroad, as well as deeper pockets in the case of Western democracy pro-
moters. Specifically, Western democracy promoters – aside from providing practical assis-
tance in the form of financial support, training, or exchange of practical experiences – 
should: 
• Accept that the democratic emerging powers face challenges distinct from those of 
Western democracy promoters. The dangers of political instability are often more im-
mediate – ethnic struggles next door, for instance, could have strong repercussions for 
their own polities – and the potential damage to their economies from failed democra-
tisation strategies beyond their borders more significant. These countries are also often 
in more direct systemic competition with authoritarian rivals, particularly China, and 
some at least – like India – need to be more conscious of their security needs. All this 
                                                 
54  Pursuing a strategy similar to China’s, essentially offering practical assistance and non-interference in 
domestic affairs in exchange for access to strategic resources, markets, and reciprocal political support, 
would mean to compete on the same terms, with uncertain outcomes given China’s deep pockets. More 
importantly, it would undermine one of the democratic emerging powers’ key assets, namely their sta-
tus as regional leaders and representatives that have democratic legitimacy. 
55  The democratic emerging powers have built only relatively modest external assistance programmes to 
date – although there are large potential benefits to be gained from further expanding regional trade and 
investment links. See Chin / Quadir (2012), as well as the other contributions in the Cambridge Review 
of International Affairs vol. 25, issue 4. 
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makes for a calculus of the costs and benefits of supporting democratisation that may 
differ from that of Western powers. 
• Insist that the democratic emerging powers uphold their own democratic standards 
and continue their domestic democratisation processes. As just mentioned, some coun-
tries – Turkey and South Africa, in particular – may be going backwards, which is a 
worrying trend. No state whose own democratic credentials are in doubt can be an ef-
fective democracy supporter elsewhere. 
• Not deviate from their own standards, as so often in the past. Perhaps the most signifi-
cant obstacle to successful partnerships with the democratic emerging powers has 
been the impression that the West harbours hidden agendas and strategies and is ready 
to compromise its own democratic principles when larger interests are at stake (most 
recently in the Middle East but historically also elsewhere, such as in Latin America). 
Overcoming this obstacle is crucial for making good on the potential for true partner-
ships between democratic emerging powers and Western democracy promoters, in 
which each side would play to its own specific advantages, and in which both sides 
could benefit from their respective knowledge and experiences. 
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